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INTRODUCTION
For nearly twenty years, the doctrine of willful infringement in
patent law has received criticism for its detrimental effects on attorneyclient privilege. The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.1 to eliminate the
“adverse inference”—a contributing cause of this discontent—signifies
an important recognition by the court that the law of willful infringement
has frustrated the core purposes of attorney-client privilege, and has
placed accused infringers in an unfair litigation posture for many years.
Yet while the court attempts to strike a balance in the equities of patent
*
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383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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infringement litigation, it should remain mindful that, although it has
changed the rules of the game, its holding has not necessarily eliminated
the inherent unbalance of willful infringement determinations. The
Federal Circuit’s decision to eliminate the “adverse inference” was
merely a cosmetic change in patent litigation because, to defeat a claim
of willful infringement, accused infringers likely will continue to obtain
and produce exculpatory opinions, and thereby waive their attorneyclient privilege. Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s intent in Knorr-Bremse,
the court has done little to reduce the “inappropriate burdens on the
attorney-client relationship”;2 therefore, it must do more to resolve this
dilemma.
Adopted by the Federal Circuit in 1986, the “adverse inference” 3
became a potent factor in a court’s evaluation of a willful patent
infringement claim. When faced with an allegation of willful
infringement of another’s patent, an alleged infringer would often obtain
an opinion from an attorney to evaluate the claim.4 Before KnorrBremse, obtaining an opinion was viewed as being “close to
compulsory,”5 because if the dispute proceeded to trial, an accused
infringer would rely on the opinion as exculpatory evidence that
infringement was not willful. Production of the opinion, however,
necessarily resulted in a waiver of the infringer’s attorney-client
privilege and possibly work-product protection for related documents.6
Even worse, if an accused infringer did not seek an opinion of counsel,
or if the accused infringer obtained an opinion yet did not produce it,
courts were free to infer that the infringement was willful and, in its
2

Id. at 1343.
See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s “silence on
the subject, in alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant the
conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its
importation and sale of the accused products would be an infringement of valid U.S.
patents.” Id. The Federal Circuit first used the term “adverse inference,” in the context of
willful infringement, in Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
4
Obtaining an opinion of counsel was a necessity even before the creation of the
“adverse inference,” because three years prior, in Underwater Devices, Inc., v. MorrisonKnudsen Co., 717 F.2d, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the Federal Circuit created an “affirmative
duty” that forced potential infringers, who acquired actual notice of a patent, “to exercise
due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.” Id. at 1389-90.
5
Terra Novo, Inc. v. Golden Gate Prods., Inc., No. C-03-2684 MMC EDL, 2004
WL 2254559, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004).
6
Jared Goff, Comment, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the
Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 218
(1998).
3
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discretion, award substantially increased damages.7 This presumption,
known as the “adverse inference,” forced an accused infringer to weigh
the risks of countering a strong inference of willful infringement—if it
did not produce an exculpatory opinion—against the risks of privilege
waiver on a party’s efforts to develop a viable infringement defense after
having been forced to tip its cards to its adversary in accordance with
discovery orders. Privilege waiver was undesirable because alleged
infringers risked the disclosure of valuable litigation strategies which
may have been embedded in the newly discoverable documents.8 This
dilemma—which some commentators have characterized as a “Catch22”9 and “Hobson’s choice”10—long put alleged infringers in a
frustrating, and arguably “unfair,”11 position.
7

See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580; see also Fromson v. Western Litho Plate
and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Where the infringer fails to
introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that
either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the
infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee’s invention.”), overruled by
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
8
See ETHAN HORWITZ & LESTER HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE &
TACTICS, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE § 9-07[13][a], 9-120.4 (1971 & Supp. 2003). Waiver,
understandably, is an unappealing option when “[a] typical document request, with
respect to willful infringement, would request the production of the following: ‘any and
all opinion from counsel and any and all documents referring to or embodying opinions
form counsel relating to infringement and/or non-infringement and/or validity and/or
invalidity of U.S. Patent_______ and/or any claim thereof.’” Id.
9
Douglas D. Salyers, The Perils of Practitioners Penning Patent Opinion,
Protecting Privilege, Preventing Production, and Other Ponderous Problems, 619
PLI/PAT 955, 976 (2004) (“Defendants that have an opinion of counsel face a Catch-22 in
deciding if and when to produce the opinion during discovery. Producing the opinions
reveals tactical defenses and legal strategies and opens up the door to complicated waiver
of privilege issues. Withholding the opinion leads to a negative inference of willfulness
and counsel’s argument that the infringer has something to hide.”). Id.
10
Donald R. Dunner & Richard L. Rainey, Opinions of Counsel, Privilege in Patent
Litigation and Prejudice from Claiming Privilege, 376 PLI/PAT 285, 288 (1993). A
“Hobson’s choice” is defined as “the absence of a real alternative.” RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 909 (2d ed. 1998). The term derives from Thomas
Hobson, a seventeenth-century English liveryman, who required his customers to rent
either the horse that was nearest the stable door or nothing at all. Id.
11
William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing the
Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 393, 434 (2004). The following hypothetical exchange, between a small company
manager and a patent attorney, appropriately illustrates the “Catch-22” of an accused
infringer:
Imagine you were managing a small company before [the Federal
Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse decision]. One day a letter arrives, most likely on
law firm stationary and sent by registered mail.
The letter informs you of a patent that the owner—whose sole business
may be enforcement of patents—insists your company is infringing. The
letter presents a choice: Stop what you are doing, or take a royalty-bearing
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In this comment, I investigate the effects of the “adverse inference”
on patent litigation strategy before and after the Federal Circuit’s recent
decision in Knorr-Bremse. I begin by exploring the contours of willful
infringement claims in patent litigation and the origins of the “adverse
inference” as formulated by the Federal Circuit. Later, I examine the
effects of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Knorr-Bremse decisions on alleged
infringers who were compelled to strategize a defense in light of the
permissible adverse inference. An examination into the effects of the
adverse inference prior to Knorr-Bremse will serve as a useful
comparison to the state of willful infringement litigation after the Federal
Circuit’s decision. Next, I discuss the Federal Circuit’s long-anticipated
decision in Knorr-Bremse, consider the immediate effects of the holding,
and examine whether, and to what extent, the landscape of patent
infringement litigation has changed. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Knorr-Bremse will do little to relieve the dilemma faced by

license (usually accompanied by a steep “sign-up” fee). The letter informs
you that if your company continues on its current course, it will be willfully
infringing the owner’s patent rights and may be liable for up to treble
damages.
You consult with your patent counsel and learn that your company needs
to investigate the claim made in this notice letter and may need to negotiate
a license. If your company concludes that the patent is invalid or that your
activities do not infringe, you may certainly choose to not pay the licensing
fee – but you should still obtain an exculpatory opinion from your patent
counsel to defend against a charge of willful infringement
“How much,” you wonder aloud, “will such an opinion cost?”
“Well,” replies your counsel, “there is a broad range, but you should
think in the range of $10,000 to $100,000.”
“Because they sent us a simple letter?” – a letter that you later learn was
mailed to you and everyone else in your industry.
“Yes,” she patiently explains. “Under current law, you not only have a
duty to avoid infringement, but if you have reason to believe you may be
infringing, you also must obtain an exculpatory opinion. The opinion should
show that after careful consideration of the patents and your products,
counsel concludes that your activities are legal.”
“Do you mean that for the cost of that letter, they can force an entire
industry to go through this? Why, this is blackmail!”
“It gets worse,” your counsel says. “If they sue, you have to waive the
attorney-client privilege in the opinion, or the judge will all but assume
you’re a willful infringer.”
“And,” she continues, “you can expect the patent owner to use the
waiver to attempt to obtain discovery of your communications with all the
lawyers involved in your defense.”
You shake your head in disbelief.
Paul Devinsky & Stephen Becker, Ding Dong, The Inference Is Dead: When KnorrBremse Killed the Adverse Inference Rule, Accused Patent Infringers Got Their AttorneyClient Privilege Back, 27 Legal Times 43, Oct. 25. 2004, available at
http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/legaltimes1004.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
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accused patent infringers when put on notice of another’s patent. I finish,
therefore, by offering an alternative approach for the Federal Circuit that
would accomplish the goals that the court set out, yet failed, to achieve in
Knorr-Bremse.
I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND THE “ADVERSE INFERENCE”
The sine qua non of patent ownership is the right to exclude others
from doing a specific act for a finite period of time.12 Infringement is a
violation of a patentee’s right to exclude.13 Generally, the goal of patent
infringement remedies is both to compensate a patentee for losses that
result from infringing activity, and to deter future infringement.14 A
patent owner can recover losses through compensatory damages, which
are limited to amounts “adequate to compensate for the infringement.”15
Awards of punitive damages, attorney fees, and injunctions are remedies
that are designed to deter future infringement.16 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §
284, federal district courts are given the discretionary power to award
punitive damages by increasing compensatory “damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.” The statute itself provides no
criterion to determine when such trebled damages are appropriate.17 Yet

12
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (granting a patent owner “the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States”). Under 23 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2),
patent owners maintain this monopoly for a limited term “beginning on the date on which
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States.”
13
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (providing “whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent”) (emphasis added).
14
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 26 (Robert C. Clark et
al. ed., 3d ed. 2004).
15
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the
court shall assess them.”). In addition, a court may award reasonable attorney fees,
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, if it finds that an infringer’s willful infringement constitutes
an “exceptional case.” Although attorney fees are not punitive in nature, the Federal
Circuit has employed the same standard for the award of attorney fees as it does for
willfulness. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1348 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Judge Dyk concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part) (citing Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
16
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1284.
17
See SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(noting that § 284 “prescribes no standards for such increase”); see also Jurgens v. CBK,
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it is well established that a finding of willful infringement18 provides an
appropriate basis for such increased damages under this provision.19
Enhancement of damages under § 284 is a two-step process.20
“First, the fact-finder must determine if an accused infringer is guilty of
conduct, such as willfulness, upon which increased damages may be
based.”21 If such conduct is found, “the court then exercises its discretion
to determine if the damages should be increased given the totality of the

Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that § 284 “gives the court discretion to
[increase damages] but gives no criteria for doing so”).
18
As early as 1983, the Federal Circuit in Underwater Devices Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) recognized that it is not
inappropriate to award treble damages following a finding of willful infringement. Later,
in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc), the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]f infringement [is]
accidental or innocent, increased damages are not awarded for the infringement. If
infringement [is] willful, increased damages ‘may’ be awarded at the discretion of the
district court, and the amount of increase may be set in the exercise of that same
discretion.” Bad faith may also serve as a basis for enhanced damages. See Jurgens, 80
F.3d at 1570. But as the Federal Circuit has noted, the notion of “bad faith” with respect
to increased damages under § 284 “is sometimes misunderstood because the term ‘bad
faith’ has numerous patent law applications.” Id. Because “bad faith” in this context
“properly refers to an infringer’s failure to meet his affirmative duty to use due care in
avoiding infringement of another’s patent rights,” (citing Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d
at 1389-90), the court noted, “‘bad faith’ is more correctly called ‘bad faith
infringement,’ and it is merely a type of willful infringement.” Id. at 1571.
19
Patent law is not the only area in intellectual property that permits enhancement of
damages for willful infringement. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, ENDING
PATENT LAW’S WILLFULNESS GAME, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089 & n.5 (2003).
Enhanced damages are permitted in copyright law, however, a court may only increase a
damage award up to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). Under the same provision, a
judge also maintains the discretion to remit a damage award to as little as $200 if the
court finds that the “infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” Id. In trademark law, a plaintiff may elect
to recover statutory damages in cases involving counterfeit marks. 15 U.S.C § 1117(c)
(2000). If a court determines that the counterfeiting was willful, it may award up to
“$1,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed.” 15 U.S.C § 1117(c)(2) (2000).
20
See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); see also Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570.
21
Mentor H/S, 244 F.3d at 1380. This finding of fact is reviewed on appeal only for
clear error. State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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circumstances.”22 A finding of willfulness in the first step, however,
“does not by any means compel an award of enhanced damages.”23
A finding of willfulness must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.24 A party can not be held liable for infringement of a
“nonexistent patent.”25 Yet, for issued patents, “a party cannot be found
to have willfully infringed a patent of which the party had no
knowledge.”26 This is because willfulness is “by definition a question of
the actor’s intent.”27 Actual notice of another’s patent may be found, for
example, where “the patent owner offered the infringer a license, where
verbal notice of infringement was accompanied by presentation of a copy
of the patent, and where there was notification by a third party.”28 There
is no “universal rule,” however, “that to avoid willfulness one must cease
manufacture of a product immediately upon learning of a patent, or upon
receipt of a patentee’s charge of infringement, or upon the filing of
suit.”29
Although the generally accepted view is that willfulness “depends
upon the state of mind of the infringer,”30 there is no fixed degree of
culpability required to establish it.31 The Federal Circuit has noted that
“‘[w]illfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait,
but [rather] one of degree,” because “infringement may range from
unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a
patentee’s legal rights.”32 “The law of willful infringement,” the Federal
Circuit has noted, “does not search for minimally tolerable behavior, but
22
Mentor H/S, 244 F.3d at 1380. An award of increased damages “is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court, and ‘will not be overturned absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion.’” State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 948 F.2d 1573,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Modine Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
23
State Indus., 948 F.2d at 1576. See also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d
1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] finding of willfulness does not always lead to the
award of increased damages and attorney fees.”).
24
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1439-40
(Fed Cir. 1988) (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d
613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
25
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
26
Id. at 511.
27
Id. at 510.
28
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1367. “Circumstantial evidence can be used
to prove an infringer’s knowledge of the patent.” HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, §
9.07[4], 9-74 (citing Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 626 F. Supp.
667, 767 (M.D.N.C. 1985), aff’d, 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
29
Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 511.
30
HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, § 9.07[1], 9-69 (citing Rolls-Royce Ltd. v.
GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.1986)).
31
See Lee & Cogswell, supra note 11 at 397-99.
32
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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requires prudent, and ethical, legal and commercial actions.”33
Consequently, “precedent displays the consistent theme of whether a
prudent person would have had sound reason to believe that the patent
was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would be held so
if litigated.”34
The Federal Circuit, however, has not adopted a strict test to
evaluate the presence of willfulness because a trial judge is in an ideal
position “to weigh considerations such as the closeness of the case, the
tactics of counsel, the conduct of the parties, and any other factors that
may contribute to a fair allocation of the burdens of litigation as between
winner and loser.”35 An evaluation of willfulness, therefore, necessitates
a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,”36 which may
include “contributions of several factors.”37
In Bott v. Four Star Corp.,38 the Federal Circuit identified three
factors to determine whether an infringer had “acted in [such] bad faith
as to merit an increase in damages awarded against him,” including “(1)
whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another,
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection,
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it
was invalid or that it was not infringed, and (3) the infringing behavior as
a party to the litigation.”39 In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., the Federal
Circuit reiterated the Bott Factors, and offered six additional factors that
a trier of fact may consider as indicia of willfulness in a totality of the
circumstances determination.40 These include: “(4) the defendant’s size
and financial condition,” “(5) closeness of the case,” “(6) duration of
33

1997).

SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.

34
Id. “The primary consideration [in a willfulness determination] is whether the
infringer had sound reason to believe that he or she had the right to act in the manner that
was later found to be infringing.” CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1365 (emphasis
added).
35
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir.
1986). And, in fact, once a trial judge makes a willfulness determination, which “is often
accompanied by questions of intent, belief, and credibility,” precedent dictates that
appellate review provide “appropriate deference to the special role of the trial court in
making such determination. Thus a finding of willful infringement will be sustained
unless the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the trier of fact erred.”
SRI Int’l, 819 F.3d at 1465 (citations omitted).
36
Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d, 1380, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
37
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations omitted).
38
807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds, A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
39
Id.
40
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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defendant’s misconduct,” “(7) remedial action by the defendant,” “(8)
defendant’s motivation for harm,” and “(9) whether defendant attempted
to conceal its misconduct.”41 Obtaining competent legal advice “before
infringing or continuing to infringe” is another significant element in a
court’s totality of the circumstances review.42 Considered together, these
factors “assist the trial court in evaluating the degree of the infringer’s
culpability and in determining whether to exercise its discretion to award
enhanced damages and how much the damages should be increased.”43
The Federal Circuit was created,44 in part, in response to the
“widespread disregard of patent rights” which Congress felt “was
undermining the national innovation incentive.”45 Congress hoped that
the introduction of a single appellate court that would maintain the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most cases involving patent issues
would help reduce a number of damaging trends in patent law including
“forum shopping in patent litigation, a lack of uniformity in . . . patent
laws, and a high invalidity rate amount litigated patents.”46
Shortly after its formation, the Federal Circuit was quick to address
the issue of willful patent infringement in Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. Inc.47 when the court established a strong
precedent in an attempt to re-invigorate the legal obligation to respect
patent rights.48 The court held that potential patent infringers who have
actual notice of another’s patent rights, have “an affirmative duty to
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,” including
“the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before
the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”49 Commentators have
41

Id. (citations omitted).
Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.1986).
“The duty of due care normally requires that a potential infringer obtain competent legal
advice before infringing or continuing to infringe.” Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857
F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
43
Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828.
44
In 1982, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), created the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), by Consolidating the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims.
45
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
46
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 26.
47
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48
See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343.
49
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90. Also note that prior to the Federal
Circuit’s rule formulation in Underwater Devices, “four U.S. Courts of Appeal had
issued opinions that can be interpreted as holding that accused infringers have an
affirmative duty to obtain a written opinion of counsel.” Matthew D. Powers & Steven
C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 75 (2001) (citing Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677
42
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noted that this rule has gone largely unexamined; “the affirmative duty
rule is a concept that crept its way into the law, but that has not been
subject to critical examination.”50
While the presence or absence of willfulness must be evaluated
under a “totality of the circumstances” standard,51 as a practical matter, it
can be difficult for an alleged infringer to prove a lack of willfulness
because “willfulness is a determination as to a state of mind.”52 It
therefore becomes crucial for an alleged infringer to provide some
evidence of his good faith and reasonable belief that he was not
infringing. While a lack of competent legal advice did “not mandate a
finding of willfulness,”53 it was generally not enough for an alleged
infringer to counter a willful infringement complaint simply by stating
that legal counsel was obtained. In order to use the acquisition of legal
counsel as a defense to willfulness, in satisfaction of the “affirmative
duty” created in Underwater Devices, an alleged infringer was required
to submit an exculpatory opinion into evidence.54
In a willful infringement evaluation, a court does not focus on the
legal correctness of an attorney’s opinion.55 Instead, the court asks
whether the “counsel’s opinion [is] thorough enough, as combined with
other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might
reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.56
Other factors that are relevant in this inquiry are:
when the infringer sought counsel’s advice (before or after
commencing the infringing activities); the infringer’s
knowledge of the attorney’s independence, skill and
competence; the infringer’s knowledge of the nature and
extent of analysis performed by counsel in providing the
opinion; and whether the opinion contains sufficient internal
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1982); Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, 623 F.2d
645, 652 (10th Cir. 1980); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Son’s, Inc., 461 F.2d 66
(3d Cir. 1972); Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 233 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1956)).
50
Powers & Steven, supra note 49, at 76.
51
Central Soya Co. v. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
52
Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
53
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54
It is, therefore, generally advisable that counsel opinion “be drafted with the
possibility that not only will it be relied on to rebut an allegation of willfulness but that it
will also be available to a jury, if one is requested, at the liability stage of the trial.”
Hence, “while the opinion should be accurate and reasoned it should not be couched in
language which will be seized upon as a basis for the patentee to point out to the jury that
the accused infringer admits or concedes this or that issue.” HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra
note 8, § 9.07[10][i], 9-112.
55
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Indeed, the
question arises only where the counsel was wrong.” Id.
56
Id. at 944.
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indicia of credibility, including a validity analysis predicated
on a review of the file histories, and an infringement analysis
that compares and contrasts the potentially infringing method
or apparatus with the patented inventions.57
Although legal correctness is not a requirement, the thoroughness
and competency of an opinion letter is crucial to a defendant’s use of an
exculpatory opinion to defend against a claim of willfulness, otherwise
“it is of little value in showing the good faith belief of the infringer.”58
57

1993).

Thorn Emi N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Del.

58
Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir.
1998). Although legal correctness is not a requirement for a defendant to form a good
faith belief that he is not infringing, or that the accuser’s patent is invalid, a court will
nevertheless consider “[f]actors that bear on the competency of an opinion letter
includ[ing] whether counsel examined the file history of the patent, whether the opinion
was oral or written, whether the opinion came from inside or outside counsel, whether the
opinion came from a patent attorney, whether the opinion was detailed or merely
conclusory, and whether material information was withheld from the attorney.” See
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1366. An incompetent exculpatory opinion, judged on
these and other factors, can be damaging to an accused infringer if, based on the
incompetent opinion, a court determines that a good faith belief could not reasonably
have been formed. There are many other pertinent factors a court may find “helpful in
establishing indicia of competency and authoritativeness.” HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra
note 8, § 9.07[10], 9-118. These include:
• the opinion evidences an adequate foundation based on a review of all
necessary facts and is not merely conclusory on its face, presenting only
a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.
• the opinion indicates that it is based on a review of the file history of the
patent, the prior art of record, and, possibly, additional prior art. Thus,
the opinions evidence an adequate foundation.
• the opinion indicated tests, experiments and studies performed in
connection with the advice or known otherwise.
• the validity and infringement issues are analyzed in detail, including
discussions of the prior art, the accused device, and the claim language.
• the claims are not discussed as a group but are separately analyzed.
• there is separate discussion of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
• the opinion sets forth a discussion of the applicable case law.
• the opinion sets forth a discussion of possible inequitable conduct.
• the opinion sets forth the standard of one skilled in the art.
• the opinion indicates that every possible way in which the patent could
be infringed has been investigated.
• the opinion’s technological premises and facts have been checked for
accuracy and care taken to ensure that all relevant information has been
set forth in the opinion.
• the opinion is in writing and is not an offhand one.
• the opinion’s asserted defenses can be backed up with viable proof at
trial.
• whether the opinion is of in-house counsel or outside counsel it can be
established that the person rendering the opinion clearly acts
independently?
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In light of the alleged infringer’s affirmative duty to seek competent
legal advice, and the practical difficulty of evaluating the subjective
intent of an accused infringer who does not waive privilege, the Federal
Circuit created a willfulness presumption, known as the “adverse
inference,”59 to ferret out information about the defendant’s state of
mind.60 In Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc. the court held that an
infringer’s silence on the subject of competent legal advice warranted the
conclusion that no advice was obtained, or if it was obtained, it was
negative.61 Later, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., the
court reaffirmed its prior holding noting that a “court must be free to
• the opinion is rendered by U.S. counsel who is proficient in patent
matters.
• while the opinion speaks of probabilities rather than certainties the
opinion sets forth a reasonable degree of certainty that warrants the
conclusion that there is a legal right to conduct the infringing activity.
• if the opinion concludes that the patent claims are invalid for
obviousness the opinion considers defendant’s copying and other
secondary objective indicia of unobviousness, which factors precedent
require be considered.
• the opinion conclusion that the patent claims are invalid for obviousness
is not based solely on file history prior art on arguments previously put
forth by the examiner.
• the opinion is sought promptly after learning of the possible
infringement or is elicited before starting potential infringing activities.
• the opinion initiated efforts to design around the patent claims.
Id. § 9.07[10], 9-118 to 9-119.
59
See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
60
It appears as though the key justification for requiring this behavior, on the part of
defendants, was that alleged infringers already had an affirmative duty under Underwater
Devices to obtain counsel. In other areas of intellectually property, however, such a
punative inference is generally considered inappropriate. For example, in a trademark
dilution case, the Second Circuit asserted that an adverse opinion arising out of a refusal
to produce an attorney’s opinion is not justified. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191
F.3d 208, 225-26 (2d Cir.1999) overruled on other grounds Moseley v. Secret Catalogue,
537 U.S. 418 (2003). The Second Circuit noted that “if refusal to produce an attorney’s
opinion letter based on claim of the privilege supported an adverse inference, persons
would be discouraged from seeking opinions, or lawyers would be discouraged from
giving honest opinions. Such a penalty for invocation of the privilege would have
seriously harmful consequences.” Id. The court, however, recognized that patent law is
in a sufficiently different position than trademark law because alleged patent infringers
maintain a “legal duty to obtain an attorney’s opinion.” Id. at 226.
61
Id. Also note that in dicta, the Federal Circuit in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985) alluded to the possibility of
a negative inference. The Federal Circuit did not award increased damages based on the
patentee’s allegation of willfulness, thus deferring to the trial court’s denial, however it
noted that “[a] record devoid of opinions of counsel and silent on [the infringer’s]
reaction to the existence of the [patentee’s] patents may indeed lead to negative
inferences . . . .” See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 80.
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infer that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained,
it was contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of
the patentee’s invention.”62 The immediate affects of the adverse
inference is to make the “presence or absence of an opinion letter” an
important element of the trial.63 While the Federal Circuit’s affirmative
duty rule, articulated in Underwater Devices, imposes obligations on
alleged infringers to exercise due care and to obtain legal advice, the
ability to impose the “adverse inference” of willful infringement
“provides a mechanism to enforce this duty.”64 Consequently, companies
looking to avoid discovery by a patentee into their privileged attorneyclient communications may be further deterred “from deliberately
ignoring allegations of patent infringement and from withholding
royalties when a patent is valid and infringed.”65
II. THE PRE-KNORR-BREMSE EFFECTS OF THE WILLFULNESS
DILEMMA ON PATENT PRACTICE
While the “adverse inference” was a logical extension by the
Federal Circuit to enforce the “affirmative duty,” the presumption
generated many unintended consequences on patent infringement
litigation. Importantly, the inference has had the effect of “compelling
essentially all alleged infringers, regardless of culpability, to surrender
their attorney-client privilege.”66 This near-mandatory requirement is
said to have created “inappropriate”67 burdens on attorney-client
relationships.
The adverse inference rule provides patent owners with a
substantial incentive to allege willful infringement because of the ability
62
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir.
1988), overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). “Equally certain is that a court may draw
certain inferences from an infringement defendant’s failure to introduce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel at trial.” Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 911, 942
(E.D. Va. 1996), vacated, 116 F.3d 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
63
Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 81.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 99.
66
Id. at 83. As one commentator has noted, the adverse inference has created the
“curious result . . . where an accused infringer could have obtained an opinion, found it
favorable, but chosen not to waive because of other related problems, and then still
received an adverse inference.” John Hintz, Court of Appeals Changes Evidentiary Rule
Relating to Opinions of Counsel in Patent Cases, INTELL. PROP. UPDATE (Fish & Neave,
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2004 (on file with author). Consequently, the affirmative duty rule
can lead to “false positives” and “false negatives.” Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at
190-91.
67
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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to obtain an increased award of damages and because of the dilemma it
creates for accused infringers.68 Patent holders rarely hesitate to add a
count of willfulness in an infringement suit because the necessary burden
of production to support a willful infringement complaint is low.69 The
risk of Rule 11 sanctions, on account of wrongfully adding a count of
willful infringement, is very rare “once he or she has satisfactorily
alleged a count of patent infringement.”70 Therefore, it should come as
no surprise that patent owners “regularly”71 allege willful patent
infringement because plaintiffs have comparatively little to risk when
alleging willfulness and much to gain. If the alleged infringer waives
attorney-client privilege, the patentee typically tries to expand the waiver
to obtain broad discovery.72 In many cases, patent owners are
“remarkably successful in their quest” to obtain the work product and
materials communicated by litigation counsel.73 If privilege is not
waived, the patentee likewise benefits from the inference as a substantial
method to increase damages, especially in infringement cases where
compensatory damages may be low because it is difficult to evaluate the
financial detriment to a patentee.
The combination of the affirmative duty to seek competent counsel
and the adverse inference has forced “patent-savvy corporations”74 into
the common routine of using separate third-party counsel to draft the
exculpatory opinions.75 Even before it is written, it is expected that the
opinion may be used at trial by the alleged infringer to defend itself
against allegations of willful infringement.76 Consequently, only
communications between the alleged infringer and the third-party
counsel become discoverable by the plaintiff, allowing the defendant to
68
One commentator notes that “a charge of willful infringement has become a
routine adjunct to almost every pleading asserting patent infringement.” Jon E. Wright,
Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages – Evolution and Analysis,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 97 (2001) (citations omitted).
69
See Lee & Cogswell, supra note 11, at 396.
70
Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 84. “A review of caselaw indicates that no
attorney has been sanctioned under Rule 11 for adding a count of willful infringement in
a complaint once he or she has satisfactorily alleged a count of patent infringement.” Id.
71
Nicholas M. Cannella, et al. The Demise of the Adverse Inference Rule in
Evaluating Willful Infringement?, Intell. Property Today, *5, May 2004. (citing amicus
briefs prepared for the Federal Circuit’s adjudication on Knorr-Bremse) (on file with
author).
72
See Devinsky & Becker, supra note 11, at 3.
73
Id.
74
J. Matthew Buchanan, Knorr-Bremse: The Federal Circuit Eliminates the Adverse
Inference, Promote the Progress, Sept. 14, 2004, http://promotetheprogress.com/
archives/2004/09/knorrbremse_the.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
75
See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, § 9.07[10][f], 9-105.
76
Id. § 9.07[10][i], 9-112.
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shield its trial counsel from the burden of attorney-client privilege
waiver.
The strategy of using outside counsel to write the exculpatory
opinion, however, has severe drawbacks. To write an exculpatory
opinion, a third-party counsel must pick up the defendant’s file and
conduct exhaustive research to draft a proper evaluation of the alleged
infringer’s standing on the willfulness issue.77 These opinions typically
cost at least $20,000 and depending on the complexity of the case, can
frequently cost over $100,000.78 Exposure of the third-party opinion can
still hurt the trial counsel if, for instance, the third-party counsel
discussed in the opinion a particular strategy for litigation.79 At trial, the
exposure of the third-party opinion could inhibit counsel from executing
a clear strategy if the exposed opinion prematurely reveals its current
strategy or, perhaps even worse, if the strategy within the opinion is
contradictory. From a practical standpoint, knowing that their work
product may be used at trial and that it could adversely impact the trial
counsel’s strategy, the third-party counsel may feel “less free to counsel
their clients, at least in writing, about the risks of their conduct.”80
Consequently, the adverse inference has had the effect of “restraining the
[third-party counsel’s] candor in providing advice when the attorney
knew that his or her advice was likely to be released in the event of
litigation.”81
Recognizing the negative impact that the adverse inference had on
attorney-client relationships, in September 2003, the Federal Circuit
seized the opportunity, sua sponte, to re-consider the adverse inference in
light of the precedent it had established in Kloster Speedsteel and

77

See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1366
See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 102.
79
Laura M. Kelley, The Adverse Inference Rule and Advice of Counsel in Patent
Litigation, Triangle Tech Journal, http://www.triangletechjournal.com/news/article.
html?item_id=614 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). The legal theories used at trial may be
different than the legal theories discussed in the exculpatory opinion, which may have
been prepared years before litigation became an issue. Introducing an inconsistent legal
opinion at trial might confuse a jury or cause the defendant to lose credibility. Also,
waiver subjects alleged infringer to the production of additional materials. Id.
80
See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 191.
81
Walter C. Linder & William L. Roberts, Do You Want My Opinion?: What the
Knorr-Bremse Case Means for Patent Litigation, (Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis,
Minn.), at http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_1428.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). It
is reasonable to assume that an attorney may supplement his lack of candor on paper with
clarification to the client orally. Although such communications would likely remain
secret, in theory, they could become discoverable upon waiver of attorney-client privilege
following the production of the exculpatory opinion.
78
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Underwater Devices.82 The Federal Circuit took, on appeal from the
Eastern District of Virginia, a patent infringement suit following the
district court’s finding that two defendants had willfully infringed a
plaintiff’s air-disk brake patent. At trial, defendant Haldex stated that it
had obtained counsel about the plaintiff’s patents, but declined to
produce an exculpatory opinion.83 The other defendant, Dana, stated at
trial that it did not consult with counsel because it had relied on Haldex’s
legal advice.84 Accordingly, the district court assumed that Haldex’s
opinions were unfavorable, and that Dana’s opinion would have been
unfavorable had it obtained one.85 The court found that the defendants
had willfully infringed the plaintiff’s patent and awarded attorney fees.86
In its order for an en banc hearing, the Federal Circuit invited
parties to submit briefs directed to the following four issues:
1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or work product
privilege is invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit,
is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an
adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?
2. When the defendant has not obtained legal advice, is it
appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful
infringement?
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed,
and the adverse inference withdrawn as applied to this
case, what are the consequences for this case?
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement
be sufficient to defeat liability for willful infringement even
if no legal advice has been secured?87

The Federal Circuit aimed the first question at the heart of the its
holding in Kloster Speedsteel, where the court held that silence as to
whether it sought advice of counsel warranted the conclusion that advice
not obtained was bad.88 The second posited question considered the
court’s earlier holding in Underwater Devices, which established an
82
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
83
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d
843, 857 (E.D.Va. 2001) (partial summary judgment).
84
Id. at 863.
85
Id. at 863-64.
86
Id.
87
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336,
1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court also invited amicus curiae briefs addressing its
questions. More than twenty-four amici responded.
88
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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affirmative duty on the part of the alleged infringer to seek and obtain
competent legal advice.89 Anticipating that one or both answers to the
two prior questions of law may alter the Federal Circuit’s precedent, the
court asked the parties to determine how the instant suit should be
affected. Finally, the court’s fourth question asked the parties to propose
how far the benefit of an elimination of the adverse inference should be
extended.
Following the Federal Circuit’s decision to reconsider en banc
these four questions, there was widespread support in the legal
community for the elimination of the adverse inference in both
circumstances where an alleged infringer fails to waive attorney-client
privilege and fails to seek counsel.90 Amicus briefs argued that “patent
cases were the only litigation in which relying on attorney-client
privilege could proactively harm a defendant.”91 Practitioners noted that
“in the eyes of the community, the adverse inference unfairly
disadvantaged the defendants and undermined the relationship between
companies and their patent counsel.”92 The inference has been criticized,
according to practitioners, because “there are many legitimate reasons for
not obtaining or producing a legal opinion at trial . . . many of which are
unrelated to the issue of willfulness.”93 “Without the crutch of the
adverse inference rule . . . and absent the pressure to release opinions of
counsel,” it was proposed, “the patent owner’s burden to prove willful
infringement or to obtain instructive discovery [would] increase[]
significantly.”94 The elimination of the adverse inference would require
“[p]atent owners [to] have to find evidence of willful actions taken by the
accused infringer to meet the totality-of-the-circumstances test – actions
such as deliberate copying, concealment or infringing activity,
89

1983).
90

Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.

More than twenty-four amici responded “almost unanimously” supporting the
elimination of the adverse inference. Richard E. Parke, Summary of the Federal Circuit’s
Opinion in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., (Frommer Lawrence & Haug, New York,
N.Y.), at http://www.flhlaw.com/news/news_47.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
91
Linder & Roberts, supra note 81.
92
Id.
93
Kelley, supra note 79. As one commentator noted,
[o]ne common reason for wanting to withhold even a favorable opinion is
that the arguments counsel wants to make at trial contradict those made in
the opinion. For example, an opinion letter might interpret the claims of a
patent narrowly in concluding that there is no infringement, while at trial the
accused infringer might want to forego that infringement defense because a
broader understanding of the patent would render it invalid in light of newly
discovered prior art not available to the lawyer who wrote the opinion.
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, at 1113 n.86.
94
Devinsky & Becker, supra note 11, at 3.
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infringement despite only frivolous defenses, and infringement designed
to injure a competitor.”95 Nevertheless, patent attorneys generally agreed
that the “purposes and advantages of obtaining a legal opinion of noninfringement [would] not be changed”96 if the Federal Circuit were to
eliminate the adverse inference.
Although the legal community was unified in its belief that the
adverse inference should be eliminated, the extent to which patent
litigation would actually change was less certain. One commentator
noted that “[e]ven without the coercive pressure of the adverse inference,
many accused infringers will want to disclose a favorable opinion letter
and, accordingly, will have no choice but to waive privilege.”97 In
addition, analysts contended that the elimination of the adverse inference
still will not remove the “heart of the problem” that alleged infringers
feel compelled to waive privilege.98
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ELIMINATES THE
“ADVERSE INFERENCE” IN KNORR-BREMSE
After considerable anticipation, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Knorr-Bremse delivered the death knell to the “adverse inference” of
willful infringement in patent infringement litigation. While recognizing
that ‘special justification’ was always required for judicial departure
from stare decisis, the court reasoned that the ‘conceptual underpinnings’
of adverse inference precedent “have significantly diminished in force.”99
95
96
97
98

Id.

Id.
Kelley, supra note 79.
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, at 1115.
See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, 1125.
But eliminating these rules won’t do away with the heart of the problem.
That requires reconceptualizing willfulness based on the understanding that
it is the copying of an invention, not merely competitive business conduct,
that the law is designed to target. A narrower willfulness doctrine with a
more limited financial penalty attached to it will more faithfully serve the
purposes of patent law, and put an end to a longstanding and dangerous
game.

99
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984)). By this, perhaps the court meant that the adverse inference was created in a time
when patent rights were not well respected. An important contributing factor to this lack
of respect was the lack of uniformity in patent jurisprudence prior to the consolidation of
subject matter jurisdiction for patent appeals to Federal Circuit. As one commentator
noted upon reflection of the legacy of Federal Circuit ten years after its inception, “the
goal of establishing consistency in the federal judiciary is becoming a reality. The Federal
Circuit has brought uniformity to patent law.” Dennis DeConcini, Celebrating the Tenth
Anniversary of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
529, 534 (1992).
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Therefore, “a special rule affecting attorney-client relationships in patent
cases is not warranted.”100
In response to the first question posited, the Federal Circuit stated
concisely that “no adverse inference shall arise from invocation of the
attorney-client and/or work product privilege.”101 The court asserted that
this change in law was appropriate in order to curtail the adverse
inference’s “distort[ion of] the attorney-client relationship.” The court
cited the Supreme Court’s discussion in Upjohn Co. v. United States,102
to support the rationale that an unadulterated attorney-client privilege
promotes justice. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court noted that “full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients” is necessary
for attorneys to be fully informed about a client.103 An attorney who is
fully informed is better equipped to provide a client with sound legal
advice.104 Sound legal advice, in turn, invites “broader public interest[] in
the observance of law and administration of justice.”105 A client’s
willingness to communicate fully and frankly, therefore, has substantial
implications.
The Federal Circuit asserted that a client’s willingness to
communicate openly with counsel depends on the individual’s
confidence that communications will remain privileged.106 The Federal
Circuit cited Professor Wigmore who noted that clients will “‘rarely
make disclosure[s] which may be used against him.’”107 The court stated
that the current state of patent litigation where “the inference that
withheld opinion are [necessarily] adverse to the client’s actions”108
forces accused infringers to waive attorney-client privilege, thus creating
an environment where clients anticipate that communications with their
attorney will not remain privileged.109 Hence, the Federal Circuit asserted
that the adverse inference is detrimental to attorney-client privilege, and

100

Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
Id.
102
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). (holding that attorney-client privilege applies to
communications between a corporation’s lawyers and its employees if the information
discussed is relevant to the attorney’s legal advice to the corporation). It is interesting that
the Federal Circuit now cites to Upjohn, a Supreme Court case decided in 1981, as
support for the elimination of the adverse inference that the Federal Circuit created in
1986, in Kloster Speedsteel.
103
Id.
104
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1345.
107
Id. at 1344 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 at
548 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
108
Id.
109
Id.
101
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the elimination of the adverse inference in this context is appropriate.110
In circumstances where accused infringers are attempting to determine
whether or not they are infringing another’s patent, the Federal Circuit
insisted that “there should be no risk of liability in disclosures to and
from counsel.”111
In response to the second question—whether an adverse inference
is appropriate when a defendant does not obtain legal advice—the
Federal Circuit “did not mince words”112 when it held “the answer, again,
is ‘no.’”113 The court stated that “it is inappropriate to draw a similar
adverse inference from failure to consult counsel.”114 The Federal Circuit
held that “the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no
longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such
an opinion would have been unfavorable.”115
The court noted that the elimination of the adverse inference in this
context was not based on any concern for attorney-client privilege.116
Instead, the court acknowledged that a change in law was appropriate
based upon the unintended consequences that have emerged in patent
litigation as a result of some of the Federal Circuit’s prior decisions.117
The court noted that the effect of some of its decisions has contributed to
the excessive “burdens and costs” associated with obtaining opinions of
counsel for “every potentially adverse patent of which the defendant had
knowledge.”118 The court recognized that the high standard it imposed on
exculpatory opinions to “fully address all potential infringement and
validity issues,”119 from its decision in Johns Hopkins University v.
Cellpro, Inc.120 has contributed to these burdens. The court also
acknowledged the emergence of “extensive satellite litigation” in patent
law has an unintended burden of the current law.121 The Federal Circuit,
therefore, concluded that the “conceptual underpinnings” of the
affirmative duty of due care, that the court created in Underwater
Devices and Kloster Speedsteel, had been distorted.122 Although the court
stressed the continued existence of the “‘duty of care to avoid
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Hintz, supra note 66.
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1345-46.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
152 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345.
Id.
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infringement of the known patent rights of others,’”123 the court held that
it was “inappropriate to draw a[n] . . . adverse inference from failure to
consult counsel.124
The Federal Circuit then turned its attention to the subject matter of
question three: Haldex’s and Dana Corp.’s appeal. In light of the court’s
decision to eliminate the adverse inference in scenarios illustrated in
questions one and two, it chose to vacate the district court’s finding of
willful infringement and award of attorney fees.125 The court noted that
the district court had “based its willfulness determination on several
[factual findings] in addition to the adverse inference arising from [the
infringer’s] assertion of attorney-client privilege.”126 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit thought it was appropriate for the district court to
reconsider the willful infringement claim on remand upon “a fresh
weighing of the evidence.”127 The district court must consider the totality
of the circumstances without the benefit of a presumption of willful
infringement.
Although Knorr-Bremse will likely be most remembered for the
Federal Circuit’s elimination of the adverse inference, the legacy of the
decision, as it pertains to the landscape of patent litigation, may lie in the
court’s answer to the fourth question. The court held that the existence of
a substantial defense to infringement was not necessarily sufficient to
defeat liability for willful infringement if legal advice is not obtained.128
The court stressed that the question of whether an alleged infringer
received legal advice should remain a factor to consider in a court’s
totality of the circumstances inquiry.129 The court noted that it would
“decline to adopt a per se rule” because, it felt that this ruling would give
“greater flexibility” to triers of fact when considering all of the
circumstances.130 Therefore, despite the court’s assertion that an adverse
inference “flowing from the infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an
exculpatory opinion of counsel . . . is no longer warranted,”131 the court’s
answer to the fourth question leaves many of the issues, seemingly
settled in the first two questions, open again. The court stopped short of
eliminating all vestiges of the adverse inference. In many ways, this
123

Id. (citing Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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answer simply reaffirms the existing law because the existence of an
advice of counsel, while it no longer permits a presumptively adverse
factor, remains an important element in the totality of the circumstances
inquiry.
In a concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion, Circuit Judge
Dyk was sensitive to the issues the court’s opinion did not resolve. Judge
Dyk concurred with the majority’s opinion to the extent that it eliminated
the adverse inference when attorney-client privilege is not waived and
when legal opinion is not obtained.132 Judge Dyk, however, disagreed
with the majority’s reaffirmance of the affirmative duty to exercise due
care to determine whether or not one is infringing another’s patent.133
Dyk stressed that the due care requirement “has produced nothing of
benefit to the patent system.”134 Enhanced damages are useful “in cases
where the potential infringer has been guilty of deliberate copying,
concealment of infringement, or other reprehensible conduct,” Dyk
noted, but where reprehensible conduct does not exist, a patentee is
adequately protected from infringers via preliminary injunctive relief.
Dyk asserted “to stretch the law of punitive damages” in these cases is
“unnecessary.” Judge Dyk pointed to a list of undesirable consequences
that have emerged as a result of the affirmative duty of due care. These
include: “a reluctance” on the part of people in the industry “to review
patents for fear that the mere knowledge of a patent will lead to a finding
of lack of due care”; “a cottage industry of window-dressing legal
opinions by third party counsel designed to protect the real decisionmaking process between litigating counsel and the company’s
executives”; “the imposition of substantial legal costs on companies
seeking to introduce innovative products”; “and an enhanced ability of
holders of dubious patents to force competitors’ products off of the
market through the threat of enhanced damages.” 135 Despite the
purported elimination of the adverse inference, Judge Dyk concluded that
the “majority opinion does not address whether a potential infringer can
satisfy the requirement of due care without securing and disclosing an
opinion of counsel, or, if such an opinion is not absolutely required,
132

Id. at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
Id. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
134
Id. at 1351. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). Dyk also noted
that an enhancement of damages for failure to comply with the due care requirement
could not be “squared” with recent Supreme Court cases where it was held that “punitive
damages can only be awarded in situations where the conduct is reprehensible.” Id.
(Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
135
Id. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). Judge Dyk noted that amici
and other groups, including the Federal Trade Commission and National Academies,
have recognized these concerns.
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whether an adverse inference can be drawn from the accused infringer’s
failure to obtain and disclose such an opinion.”136
IV. IMMEDIATE REACTION TO KNORR-BREMSE
A. Practitioners React
Immediately following the Knorr-Bremse decision, commentators
were generally optimistic about the new change in law. One
commentator suggested that “the entire patent bar seemed to heave a sigh
of relief,” because “no longer [would] patent counsel face the dreaded
adverse inference Catch-22.”137 The decision, in one attorney’s opinion,
“‘reverses the erosion of the attorney-client privilege we’ve seen over the
past 20 years,’” and “‘essentially restores the protection of attorneyclient privilege.’”138 Another attorney quipped that “‘[t]he Federal
Circuit just dropped a house on the Wicked Witch of the West.’”139 In his
opinion, “‘the deck [was] swept clean,’” due to the elimination of the
adverse inference because “‘[a]ll presumptions are gone, so a defendant
is no longer guaranteed to lose.’”140
Law firms also appeared to react positively to the news of the
Knorr-Bremse decision. In its client newsletter, one firm noted that the
inference “used to be the ‘thumb on the scale’ that weighed heavily
against defendants in court.”141 The firm noted that the change in law,
however, “may have created a more evenly balanced battleground
between plaintiffs and defendants.”142 Another firm commented that the
Knorr-Bremse decision “frees those accused of willful infringement from
the Hobson’s choice of waiving privilege . . . in the face of a virtually
dispositive adverse inference.”143 Even if a defendant receives a
favorable opinion of counsel, after the elimination of the adverse
inference, one firm noted, the defendant may choose to keep its opinions
secret because otherwise it “effectively opens the barn doors and gives
136

Id. at 1352 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
Steve Anderson, Federal Circuit Strikes Down Presumed-Guilty Rule, 14 CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, 156, Nov. 2004. Another article that reported the Knorr-Bremse decision
was aptly titled “Ding-Dong, The Inference Is Dead.” Devinsky & Becker, supra note
11.
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the opposing side the opportunity to seek other privileged documents or
email related to the invention in discovery.”144 Moreover, if an opinion is
bad, a defendant should feel more comfortable in its decision to not
disclose the opinion. Also, in response to a question that the majority
recognized that it had left open, one firm noted that the elimination of the
inference may now allow accused infringers to “argue that the mere
existence of an opinion, even without its production during discovery,
shows good faith, a factor disproving willfulness.”145
B. Effects on Existing Cases
Following the Knorr-Bremse decision, district courts appeared to be
receptive to the change in law. In at least one instance, while responding
to a motion to quash a plaintiff’s discovery requests, a district court
granted a defendant the option to withdraw an advice-of-counsel defense
the defendant had asserted prior to the Knorr-Bremse decision. The court
in Terra Novo, Inc., v. Golden Gate Products, Inc.146 recognized that “the
negative inference,” which existed prior to Knorr-Bremse, “rendered the
waiver of attorney-client privilege less than voluntary.” The district court
was therefore willing to give the defendant the choice of either “fil[ing] a
statement of intent not to rely upon the advice of counsel defense against
willfulness,” or “submit to the discovery authorized in [the court’s]
order.”147
As a result of a general willingness by the courts to give defendants
the opportunity to benefit from the Federal Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse
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Linder & Roberts, supra note 81.
Hintz, supra note 66.
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No. C-03-2684 MMC EDL, 2004 WL 2254559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004).
147
Id. This choice really ended up providing the defendant with the best of both
worlds. Despite the fact that the court advocated for a narrower waiver following KnorrBremse (“waiver . . . is only as broad as necessary to assure fair disclosure on the subject
matter of the advice”) the discovery authorized by the district court was not terribly
restrictive. Id. at *2. The permitted discovery included selected communications between
the defendant’s opinion counsel and litigation counsel, and selected work product
prepared by the litigation counsel. Id. at *3. However, in another case in the same district
as Terra Novo, the court found support in Knorr-Bremse for its decision to maintain a
limited waiver approach following a defendant’s assertion of the advice-of-counsel
defense. Collaboration Properties, Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., 2004 WL 2296953, at 3 (N.D.
Cal). The district court deemed a limited waiver system appropriate in light of the Federal
Circuit’s interest “‘that full communication and ultimately the public interest in
encouraging open and confidential relationships between client and attorney’” be
promoted. Id. at *3 n.4 (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v.
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)). The court apparently
believed a broad waiver system would not promote the attorney-client relationship in this
context.
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decision, defendants will likely take advantage of the change of law.148
Following Knorr-Bremse, however, the Federal Circuit did not intend to
disturb every appealed decision related to findings of willful
infringement.149 The Federal Circuit appears willing to provide
defendants an opportunity to relitigate an unfavorable finding of
willfulness if the trial court’s decision was significantly affected by a
pre-Knorr-Bremse adverse inference. But where the adverse inference
was not a significant factor in the willfulness determination, the court is
likely to leave the decision undisturbed.

148
In at least one instance, however, a defendant was unable to use the change in law
to its benefit. In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 2005 WL
100925, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2005), a patent infringer attempted to avoid an order that would
collaterally estop it from relitigating the issue of validity of the plaintiff’s patent claim, an
issue that had been fully litigated prior to the Knorr-Bremse decision. The defendant
argued that its inability to take advantage of its rights arising from its waiver of attorneyclient privilege “played a central role” in the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s patent was
valid. Id. The district court, however, held that the intervening change in law pertained
only to attorney-client privilege and willfulness, and was unrelated to a jury’s prior
finding of the plaintiff’s patent validity. Id.
Shortly after its holding in Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit also appeared poised
to change how it adjudicated appeals pertaining to district court findings of willful
infringement. Where a defendant’s failure to produce an opinion of counsel significantly
influenced a district court’s finding of willful infringement, as it did in Knorr-Bremse, the
Federal Circuit, in Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated the willfulness finding and ordered the district court to reconsider the issue based on “a fresh weighing of the evidence.” Id. The lack of an
opinion of counsel, however, was not the only evidence that weighed against the accused
infringer. The Federal Circuit noted that the district court enhanced damages in part due
to the defendant’s “‘flagrant display of deliberate misconduct . . . throughout [the]
proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Insituform Techs., Inc., v. Cat Contracting, Inc., No. Civ.A.H90-1690, 1999 WL 33914622, at *29 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 1999)).
149
In Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2005), the Federal Circuit left a jury’s willfulness determination untouched even though
the infringer had not pursued an advice-of-counsel defense. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v.
Jazz Photo Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 434, 456 n.29 (D.N.J. 2003). According to the district
court, the jury’s willfulness determination was not significantly affected by an adverse
inference. Id. The district court added “[i]ndeed, no such opinion could exist. While
ordinarily the absence of an opinion is of critical significance in any willfulness inquiry,
it is of less importance under the circumstances presented here – i.e. where the alleged
infringer knew that a particular action would constitute infringement, but claims not to
have known that it was taking the action.” Id. Instead, the district court noted, the jury
could properly have based its willfulness determination on a finding of a lack of
credibility of the defendant’s only proffered evidence aimed to support his claim that he
lacked the requisite knowledge to form a willful intent to infringe: his own testimony. Id.
at 457. Even if the Federal Circuit had vacated the finding of willfulness, however, there
would have been no obvious benefit to the defendant because at trial the district court, in
its discretion, did not enhance the damages as a result the jury’s willfulness determination
anyway.
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C. Yet What Was Actually Accomplished?
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse likely will
be remembered for the court’s elimination of the adverse inference that
had weighed heavily on accused patent infringers for nearly twenty
years. But what remains unclear is whether the decision, as a practical
matter, will create an improvement in the landscape of patent litigation
strategy. The majority opinion grounded its decision to eliminate the
inference largely in an effort to restore confidence in attorney-client
relationships, and to reduce some of the unnecessary burdens imposed on
innovators who may be infringing.150 But despite these laudable
intentions, some have questioned whether the elimination of the adverse
inference will actually advance these goals.
The majority opinion justified its answer to the second question—to
eliminate the adverse inference in the situation where a defendant failed
to consult counsel at all—in part on the “burdens and costs” associated
with the requirement for “early and full study by counsel of every
potentially adverse patent of which the defendant has knowledge.”151
However, most commentators and law firms insist that despite this
holding, an opinion of counsel will still “remain the gold standard among
defenses to willfulness.”152 In what seems to be a win-win situation for
law firms, one commentator noted that “Knorr-Bremse should not
change the corporate best practices in dealing with a known patent which
presents a potential infringement problem, i.e., to timely obtain a well
reasoned opinion from a competent patent counsel, preferably from an
outside counsel.”153 “Therefore, the Knorr-Bremse decision does not alter
the advisability of obtaining an opinion of counsel for the purpose of
rebutting a charge of willfulness.”154 This commentator further asserted
that Knorr-Bremse’s holding “merely makes the absence of an
exculpatory opinion a neutral factor for determining willful infringement.
Therefore, the Knorr-Bremse decision does not alter the advisability of
150

See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
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Decision Marks Significant Changes in Willful Infringement Law, But Patent Opinions of
Counsel May Remain As Important As Ever (Baker Botts LLP, New York, N.Y.) Sept. 1,
2004, http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications/detail.aspx?id=63f184c8-bfcb4829-acc9-e5840b4e66b4 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
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obtaining an opinion of counsel for the purpose of rebutting a charge of
willfulness.”155
Law firms stand to lose important business if opinions of counsel
are no longer regularly obtained by clients. Yet firms are probably
offering their clients good advice. As one commentator aptly noted, even
though the patentee still carries the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that based on the totality of the circumstances the
infringement was willful, “evidence that the infringer had relied on and
followed a well reasoned and timely opinion of competent patent counsel
is likely to be the best evidence to rebut the charge [of willful
infringement] by establishing a prudent belief that the infringer’s actions
were lawful and that the infringer had a good faith belief that he had no
liability.”156 The commentator further asserted that “in most cases, other
evidence that the infringer had a prudent belief that what he was doing
did not violate patent rights is not nearly as persuasive.”157 And further,
“[i]f the client is willing to spend the money on an opinion at all, [the
client] will likely go the extra distance to get the outside opinion to
protect themselves down the line if they, in fact, do want to waive it.”158
Therefore, if defendants are still likely to seek opinions of outside
counsel anyway, even after the holding in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate the
adverse inference when no opinion is obtained, then it appears as though
the decision actually did little to reduce the burden on defendants.
Alleged infringers continue to be burdened both financially, by obtaining
attorney opinions, and strategically, because of the necessary waiver of
privilege when the opinion is produced as exculpatory evidence.
The majority opinion justified its answer to the first question—to
eliminate the adverse inference in situations where a defendant obtains
an opinion but chooses not to waive privilege—by emphasizing the
“inappropriate burdens” the adverse inference placed “on the attorneyclient relationship.”159 Yet, in the same opinion, the Federal Circuit did
155

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
158
Daniel J. Schwartz & Scott A. Spencer, Federal Circuit Redefines Willful
Infringement Analysis, (Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, I.L.) http://www.jenner.com/
files/tbl_s20Publications/RelatedDocumentsPDFs1252/796/Federal_Circuit_Redefines_
Willful_Infringement_Analysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). But see Devinsky &
Becker, supra note 11, at 3 (“Today, if you receive a letter using a patent claim to troll
for dollars, you are still well advised to consult with patent counsel. But the outcome of
that consultation is far more likely to be calibrated to the seriousness of the allegation and
will not result in the automatic recommendation that an exculpatory opinion be obtained
as soon as possible.”).
159
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
156
157

296

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:269

not establish which factors triers of fact should consider in willfulness
and damage enhancement inquiries.160 Instead, the court reasserted that
these determinations are to be made “on consideration of the totality of
the circumstances,” and noted that such determination “may include
contributions of several factors” the court previously delineated in
Read.161 In its answer to the fourth question—that the existence of a
substantial defense to infringement is not necessarily sufficient to defeat
liability for willful infringement—the court reasoned that triers of fact
were in a better position “to accord each factor the weight warranted by
its strength in the particular case.”162 This approach, the court suggested,
would provide “greater flexibility” for a trier of fact “to fit the decision
to all of the circumstances.” The court noted that willful infringement,
“‘as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of degree.’”163
Yet, by leaving this determination open, the court implicitly
acknowledged the fact that a lack of privilege waiver by a defendant
could still have a substantial effect on a court’s willfulness
determination. Therefore, instead of actually eliminating the
“inappropriate burden” on defendants, the court appears to have
reinforced the burden by still leaving a trier of fact with the responsibility
to consider a defendant’s lack of opinion in the “totality of the
circumstances” evaluation.
The reaffirmance of this flexible approach alarmed law firms and
commentators as well. By providing more flexibility, one law firm article
noted, the court “left in place . . . a continuing confusion” surrounding
these determinations.164 Judge Dyk expressed similar criticism for the
courts unwillingness to provide clear guidance. Because the majority did
not eliminate the affirmative duty of care, Judge Dyk emphasized, the
duty of care will remain a critical factor in the willfulness
determination.165 Consequently, Dyk asserted, “no one can seriously
doubt that, both in the minds of the jurors (in determining willfulness)
and in the decision of the district court (concerning enhancement), the
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duty of care is by far the preeminent factor in the vast majority of
cases.”166
In summary, the Federal Circuit eliminated the adverse inference in
circumstances where a defendant obtains an opinion of counsel but does
not produce it, and when a defendant does not seek legal counsel at all.
The court justified this change in law on the negative impacts the
inference has had on attorney-client relationships, and the excessive
burdens and costs that are associated with the opinion practice. Yet,
based on the reaction of the legal community, clients that would obtain
opinions of counsel in the past, probably still will. This is because,
despite the court’s decision to eliminate the presumption, there will still
be an incentive to produce the opinion because it will be hard to rebut a
claim of willfulness if the underlying infringement ultimately is found to
have occurred. Inevitably, there will be scenarios where a defendant’s
decision to not produce an opinion, as a result of the Knorr-Bremse
decision, will work to their advantage. But for the vast majority of cases,
an opinion of counsel will remain the best evidence to rebut a claim of
willfulness. Therefore, the goals of the majority opinion in KnorrBremse appear to remain unfulfilled. If this is true, it is reasonable to
conclude that Knorr-Bremse did not really change very much at all.
V. IMPROVEMENT: APPLICATION OF SELECTIVE WAIVER
If accused patent infringers continue to regularly seek opinions of
counsel and thereafter waive attorney-client privilege in order to offer an
opinion to defeat a willful infringement claim, the “inappropriate burdens
on the attorney-client relationship”167 inevitably remain strong despite
the elimination of the adverse inference by the Federal Circuit in KnorrBremse. Defendants are not likely to change their behavior as a result of
the Knorr-Bremse holding. The dilemma of alleged patent infringers will
continue until the Federal Circuit revisits the premise of exculpatory
opinions in patent infringement suits.
If the Federal Circuit permitted defendants to offer an opinion of
counsel as exculpatory evidence without necessarily waiving attorneyclient privilege, the central goals of Knorr-Bremse would be achieved.
Such a system would amount to a selective waiver process whereby a
defendant would not be forced to comply with overzealous discovery
requests by plaintiffs.168 Selective waiver is generally considered to be
unfair because it allows a party to use communications borne out of the
166
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attorney-client privilege as both a “cloak and dagger.” Although certain
new dangers would exist, a selective waiver system would be most
equitable in patent infringement litigation. As it currently stands,
plaintiffs are able to unfairly exploit accused infringers by forcing
competitors to spend large amounts of money on, perhaps gratuitous,
exculpatory opinions when the plaintiff obtains a new patent. Plaintiffs
are also able to abuse defendants when, simply as matter of routine, they
add a claim of willful infringement, thereby forcing defendants into the
classic “Hobson’s Choice.” Because the risk of Rule 11 violations are
extremely low for plaintiffs, their use of a willfulness allegation amounts
to an unfair dagger in an accused infringer’s defense strategy. Despite the
Federal Circuit’s efforts, the Knorr-Bremse decision has not alleviated
the defendant’s quandary. A selective waiver system, however, would
help level the playing field.
For all of its benefits, a selective waiver system does present new
risks. Such a system may create an environment where lawyers are less
candid in written opinions because they will be able to supplement their
legal advice through other means. Most important, other
communications, such as meetings with a client, would not be
discoverable under this system. On its face, therefore, it appears as
though a selective waiver system would promote the so-called “window
dressing” opinion practice, or perhaps even create a market for the “sayanything-lawyer.” The likelihood that these counterproductive practices
will occur, however, is not as substantial as it may appear. District courts
currently analyze exculpatory opinions drafted by lawyers very carefully.
To be considered competent, an opinion must satisfy many substantive
requirements.169 Significantly, opinions must: be rendered by attorney’s
who are “proficient in patent matters”;170 opinions must “evidence an
adequate foundation based on a review of all necessary facts [that] is not
merely conclusory on its face, presenting only a superficial or off-thecuff analysis”;171 and an “opinion [must] indicate[] that it is based on a
review of the file history of the patent, the prior art of record, and,
possibly, additional prior art.”172 Although an attorney will inevitably
tailor an opinion in a light most favorable to his client, an attorney must
nevertheless write truthfully and exhaustively about potential
infringement claims in order to satisfy these substantive exculpatory
169
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opinion requirements. Responsible lawyering will continue as long as
trial courts remain critical and demanding of attorney opinions.
Plaintiffs will not be burdened unfairly by a selective waiver
system. The production of an exculpatory opinion, by itself, does not
oblige a trier of fact to find a lack of willfulness. If a court determines,
based on a totality of the circumstances review, that a defendant was
willful—in spite of the existence of an exculpatory opinion—plaintiffs
will nevertheless obtain adequate relief. A selective waiver system will
continue to encourage defendants to seek legal opinions, and at the same
time, eliminate the unfair dilemma associated with attorney-client
privilege waiver.
A selective waiver system does not alleviate the financial burden on
defendants to seek advice of counsel. Due to the continued viability of a
(however subdued) negative inference, in the totality of the
circumstances review, the Knorr-Bremse holding did not diminish this
burden either. Selective waiver, however, has the potential to accomplish
the unrealized goal of the Federal Circuit to reduce the unfair burdens on
the attorney-client relationship.
In a curious result, if the Federal Circuit adopted a selective waiver
system, the pre-Knorr-Bremse “adverse inference,” arguably, would be
appropriate. In fact, in a selective waiver system, the original goal of the
“adverse inference,”—to permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable
assumption about an accused infringer’s subjective understanding
regarding the risk of infringement—would be realized. Aside from
financial reasons, no longer would defendants stand to lose as much by
withholding the attorney’s opinion in discovery. If in selective waiver
system the production of the opinion does not result in waiver of
attorney-client privilege, an “adverse inference” would further promote
responsible behavior on the part of defendants.
Although a defendant may have other legitimate reasons for not
producing an opinion, even in a selective waiver system, these risks may
be reduced substantially if the opinion is drafted responsibly (i.e. such
that the opinion does not offer too much advice such that it would
necessarily hinder future litigation strategy, but would nevertheless offer
a client proper analysis of his current situation). Hence, under a selective
waiver system, the “adverse inference” that existed prior to the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse would be practicable.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate the
“adverse inference” was unanimously supported by the legal community.
Despite this support, however, it appears as though the goals, which
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prompted the court’s change in law, will not be realized. In the wake of
the decision, defendants will likely continue to be burdened by the cost
of obtaining opinions of counsel when facing a possible willful
infringement charge. Defendants will also likely feel compelled to offer
that opinion as evidence of its good faith, thereby waiving attorney-client
privilege. The elimination of the “adverse inference” does not reconcile
the fact that courts must continue to consider the defendant’s conduct
based on a “totality of the circumstances” review. The elimination of the
inference does not change the fact that, in a “totality of the
circumstances” determination, a defendant’s best defense against a
willfulness claim is an exculpatory opinion.
The Federal Circuit could alleviate this dilemma, I propose, if it
adopts a selective waiver system that permits a defendant to offer an
opinion of counsel while not requiring waiver of attorney-client
privilege. Although this system presents new risks, such a system would
help create a more equitable litigation environment in patent
infringement suits.
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